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Collective Begging at Its Best:  




South Dakota has a unique set of collective bargaining laws that cause some observers to 
ponder whether it should even be considered collective bargaining (Finch, 1979). In essence, we 
have the weakest set of tools available to labor. However, in our most recent round of 
negotiations, we won some modest victories despite many obstacles. If we can win under these 
circumstances, our experiences might help other faculty unions who possess similar or stronger 
legal environments.  
It is well-recognized that the rights and prerogatives of public employee labor unions have 
been under assault in recent years, as witnessed by events in Michigan, Wisconsin and Ohio. In 
South Dakota, Council of Higher Education (COHE), the faculty labor union, has suffered from 
a weak legal position for more than thirty years; we have few bargaining tools in our belt. The 
COHE has primarily played defense, trying to defeat onerous proposals offered by the South 
Dakota Board of Regents (BOR). Given our weakened status, our past success in killing 
fashionable management fads derived from our persistence and ability to show how these 
proposals would play out in the field. In some cases, the BOR imposed provisions that we argued 
were unworkable and we were proven right over time.  
This paper attempts to answer two questions: What lessons can be learned from South 
Dakota faculty’s experience that might help other similarly situated faculty unions? Further, 
what does this case study teach us about the disparity of power, especially where one party has 
few legal and political tools in comparison to its counterpart? This paper is written by an insider; 
I was the labor union president and chief negotiator in the most recent bargaining round with the 
attendant biases. The paper proceeds in two parts. The first part discusses the legal and political 
environment of public faculty unions in South Dakota. In the second part, I apply DiGiovanni’s 
(2011) typology of “intangible influences” on collective bargaining to explain our success. The 
Appendix overviews the most recent bargaining round and the victories achieved.  
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Context of Faculty Labor Unions in South Dakota 
Ostensibly to prevent the rise of aggressive labor unions, South Dakota passed a “right to 
work” statute in 1945. The Rushmore State was the fourth state in the nation to mandate “open 
shops,” where employees cannot be required to join a union or to pay an agency fee to the union 
(Lee 1996). Like much of the country, South Dakota felt the “red scare” of anti-communism. 
Primarily stirred up by corporate business interests and a few publicity-seeking politicians, it 
foreshadowed the McCarthyism of the 1950s. In 1946, South Dakota voters approved a “right to 
work” constitutional amendment (Lee, 1996). 
In the 1960s, faculty at many universities throughout the country began organizing labor 
unions. These activities reflected a larger interest in labor unions among public employees 
generally (DeCew, 2003; Ladd & Lipset, 1973). In response to this trend, the South Dakota 
Legislature approved a bill in 1969 that allowed public employers to “meet and confer” with 
authorized labor representatives (Finch, 1979). This action could be viewed positively as a first 
step to provide public employees with collective bargaining rights.  
The following year, the law was strengthened to require public agencies to “negotiate” with 
organized labor unions, following the specific meanings as set forth by the National Labor 
Relations Board. Further, in 1973, a new law defined “good faith” bargaining that required a 
statement of rationale for all bargaining proposals (Finch, 1979; SDCL § 3-18-2). On their face, 
these progressive laws would indicate that South Dakota was in step with other states that 
provided fairer treatment of public employee labor unions. 
More cynically, these efforts could be perceived as an effort to circumscribe the power of 
public employee labor unions (Finch, 1979; Smyser, 1972). By providing a severely restricted 
space for public employee labor unions to organize and “negotiate” with agency managers, the 
situation was more sinister than it appears on its face. South Dakota’s public employee labor 
unions possess few tools to encourage or to force agency managers to an agreement. First, South 
Dakota law does not allow public employees to strike and it applies a broad definition of strike 
with severe penalties possible for violators (Finch, 1979; SDCL §§ 3-18-9 to 3-18-14). Second, 
South Dakota statute does not provide for binding arbitration as a means of conflict resolution. 
Without the possibility of a strike or binding arbitration, South Dakota’s public employee labor 
unions do not possess an anvil on which to hammer managers to agree. 
After presentation of bargaining proposals, either side may formally declare an impasse. 
Like many states, the other side may request mediation, which may be followed by fact finding, 
both administered by the State Department of Labor. In South Dakota, public agencies may 
completely ignore any suggestions offered by a mediator and are not obliged to follow a fact 
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finder’s opinion. The primary outcome is that either side could use these findings to mobilize 
public opinion. Nonetheless, at the completion of the fact finding process, the agency is required 
by law to impose its last-best offer, which may be its first-worst offer. Unlike most states, the 
public employer is not just permitted to impose its last best offer, but is required to do so. Couple 
the unions’ inability to strike and the lack of arbitration with the agency’s authority to impose a 
contract, our system of collective bargaining is better described as collective begging.  
Since a flurry of legislation four decades ago, South Dakota has made no further moves to 
empower public employee labor unions. It has killed several proposals for agency fees, which 
would allow a labor union to charge a fee of non-members to service the contract. And similar to 
other states, several bills in recent years have attempted to curb union activities, most notably 
among municipal employees. In 2010, 79% of South Dakota voters approved a measure that 
requires a secret ballot to form a labor union; this measure resembled a bill debated in Congress 
at the time. 
In South Dakota, municipal employees and teachers unions retain the ability to bargain 
salary and benefits. However, state employees do not enjoy the same privileges. The state 
legislature determines salary and benefits for all state employees by statute, not by negotiations, 
regardless of whether the state employees are represented by labor unions or not.  
As state employees, public university faculty members experience the same labor 
conditions as other state employees, but with the further insult of being deprived of across-the-
board salary increases. South Dakota faculty face the opprobrium of being the only employees in 
the entire state of South Dakota, public or private, who are denied—by state law—the possibility 
of across-the-board salary increase. When the Legislature grants other state employees an 
increase in salary, these salary increases are awarded as a percent of their base salary, but not for 
faculty. In an unfair manner, then, faculty are specifically forbidden from enjoying such an 
uniform increase. Rather, state law requires that any salary increase must be awarded to 
individual faculty based on merit, market, and institutional priorities (SDCL 3-18-3).  
Currently, faculty are the only state employees who are organized for collective bargaining. 
The 1,200 faculty at all six public universities organize in a single bargaining unit, represented 
by COHE, which is affiliated with the South Dakota Education Association/National Education 
Association. Notwithstanding dramatic differences among the universities in size, mission, 
research scope, history, and workload expectations, all university faculty are placed in a single 
bargaining unit.2 COHE negotiates directly with the BOR staff for a statewide master contract 
                                                 
2
 Faculty members at the law and medical schools, as well as certain clinical instructors, are excluded from the 
higher education bargaining unit. The BOR also administers the state schools for the deaf and the blind. Teachers at 
both these schools are represented by COHE but negotiate a separate agreement with the BOR. 
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and local campuses negotiate unique workload agreements, analogous to the New Jersey state 
colleges’ bargaining arrangement (DiObilda, 2012). Similar to the State Universities of New 
York, all public universities in South Dakota—including the flagships—negotiate a single 
contract. 
Faced with this feeble set of tools, COHE has engaged in a defensive battle for much of its 
history, attempting to defeat the most onerous BOR proposals to deny faculty rights. Effective 
July 1, 2013, after 30 months of intensive negotiations, our recent contract produced the first 
positive victories for faculty at the public universities in more than two decades (BOR/COHE 
Agreement, 2013). These victories are detailed in the Appendix. In brief, the first round of these 
negotiations resulted in an imposed contract that produced two modest victories for faculty: a 
slight increase in pay for overload courses and performance averaging of salary increases. The 
second round led to a signed contract that included two larger victories: changes in layoffs 
procedures and non-termination protections for Instructor ranks. 
Intangible Influences on Collective Bargaining 
We now turn to these central questions: Why did this unusual bargaining round in South 
Dakota public higher education occur? To what extent did COHE’s actions foster our victories? 
What did COHE do right to win this first victory in decades? I employ DiGiovanni’s (2011) 
intangible influences on collective bargaining to explore the strategy and tactics that led to these 
bargaining successes. His framework, based on his experience with many rounds of collective 
bargaining over the years, provides a solid typology to answer these questions. 
The Role of History 
DiGiovanni indicates that the history is “perhaps the single most distinguishing 
characteristic of labor negotiations” for three reasons (2011, p. 2). First, negotiations are part of a 
long-term, ongoing relationship that includes previous bargaining rounds, formal grievance 
filings, layoffs, and numerous other interactions. Second, particular events tend to loom large in 
that relationship (e.g., an administrator’s poor decisions, a brash union officer’s words, or a bitter 
strike). Third, history is often inaccurately perceived. Poorly remembered events, often retold by 
others, form the basis for judgment. 
While individual slights are important, they pale in comparison to the larger historical 
factors I identify here. I review some elements of the bargaining history between BOR and 
COHE above. Simply put, we have an unequal balance of power. Productive bargaining occurs 
when the parties have mutual respect, which requires equity of resources. The inequality inherent 
in collective begging I describe above produces a dysfunctional relationship. From COHE’s 
4
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol5/iss1/4
perspective, management has shown only passing interest in our arguments and have persistently 
discounted our ability to rile up the general faculty on contentious issues. 
However, the broader context of higher education policy played a far larger role in labor-
management relations in this round of negotiations. Public higher education in South Dakota has 
seen a dramatic shift to a research focus in the last decade. Gov. Mike Rounds (R, 2003-2010) 
broke with past tradition, where the universities were seen almost solely as institutions of 
undergraduate education. Now, research endeavors that might produce economic development in 
the state and/or additional revenues for the universities are strongly encouraged and supported. 
Gov. Rounds directed substantial energies to develop the research infrastructure and capacity of 
the universities; his successor continues that initiative. Although his effort began with 
commercializable research, the initiative has blossomed to enhance research and creative 
endeavors across all disciplines, especially at the three doctoral-granting institutions. Of course, 
much of this new energy has occurred with limited new funding. The state and the universities 
have successfully leveraged small amounts of internal and external funds as seed money for 
larger projects. 
Besides this research initiative, the arc of public higher education in South Dakota marks 
the increasing centralization of administrative power by the BOR system office over the last two 
decades. The implementation of the research initiative has affected all universities, including the 
faculty at the three smaller undergraduate institutions who continue to have heavy teaching 
loads. As compared to the past, BOR policy now supplants many decisions made by the local 
universities. System-wide standardization includes the entire range of university policies 
affecting both students and faculty in innumerable and far-reaching areas, including (and to 
mention but a few) curriculum articulation across six diverse universities, common general 
education and graduation requirements, centrally-mandated purchases of software, and faculty 
workload. 
From the BOR’s perspective, centralization is a perfectly rational strategy for the political 
context in which they find themselves. Faced with an amateur legislature, a very conservative 
electorate, and limited state revenues, the BOR perceives itself as one state agency in 
competition with other state agencies for very limited new resources. However, this “one size fits 
all” approach to higher education policy has been particularly difficult for faculty to embrace as 
we recognize the uniqueness of our particular programs and the unintended consequences of 
these system-wide decisions. These “shared business services” often require extended cross-
campus negotiations and include additional costs (e.g., for software that was designed for one 
university, not six). The entire model makes each university less nimble and responsive to 
5
Aguiar: Collective Begging in South Dakota
Published by The Keep, 2013
constituents. Standardization comes with a cost, both financial and educational, nor does it 
always lead to efficiency.3  
As a result of declining state support similar to that at other public universities, South 
Dakota undergraduates pay an increasingly higher proportion of the costs of their education than 
in the past. Unfortunately, other nationwide trends have also been embraced locally, especially 
onerous market-driven approaches to higher education. These management fads will be familiar 
to those in higher education, including “the student as customer,” heavy recruitment of out-of-
state students, an explosion of resort-like amenities, and programmatic decisions that reflect 
head-count demand rather than pedagogy. 
In short, in South Dakota, the trajectory of historical and political trends played a 
substantial role in these negotiations. Two historical facts influenced the outcome of bargaining 
more than the on-going relationship between the parties. First, COHE could not point to a single 
significant victory in recent decades. Second, the system-wide rapid transformation to a research 
focus provided COHE with an opportunity to win. 
The Setting of Expectations 
DiGiovanni (2011) hypothesizes that initial expectations play a significant role in whether 
a final settlement will be considered a good or bad deal. In particular, he warns that 
unrealistically high or poorly informed expectations can severely damage the possibility of a 
settlement, particularly with new leadership on either side. Perhaps COHE might have proceeded 
differently, if we had read and followed DiGiovanni’s (2011) sage advice. However, in our case, 
elevated expectations may have led to more productive engagement by union members in 
preparation for bargaining than in the past. Further, maybe the lack of victories in the recent past 
made our main argument valid: doesn’t COHE deserve to win once, for a change? 
As part of my presidential campaign in 2009, I produced a “white paper” outlining a two-
pronged strategy, which I circulated among COHE activists. In brief, I argued we needed to 
recruit junior faculty as members and win “something big” in bargaining. The two goals 
supported each other. While not as comprehensive or detailed as the strategic planning process 
employed at Rowan University (DiObilda, 2012; Zazzali, 2012), our effort was the first attempt 
by COHE in recent years to develop proposals with broad-scale participation by members and 
non-members. 
                                                 
3
 We have seen some deviations from the centralization approach in the last couple of years, particularly a new 
revenue-based budgetary model that returns the bulk of tuition and fees to the university that generated it. Also, 
BOR policies now recognize the need for campus differences in mobile computing, admissions standards, and 
tuition rates. 
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We needed more visibility and an on-going effort to invite faculty to join COHE. We 
sought the low-hanging fruit; those already inclined to join, but who had not been asked. We 
created a database of faculty emails, because several universities did not allow us to use their 
“all-faculty” email distribution list. In this database, each faculty member was categorized by 
university and whether they were a COHE member or not, so we could target our messages to 
particular audiences. Thus, began a series of letters and communiqués on various issues. COHE 
visibility increased and far more information was provided to members and non-members than in 
the past, and membership grew as a result. 
Through the COHE Board of Directors, we reached out to allies and potential allies. 
Following the servant-leader model (Greenleaf, 1977), I used my resources to assist them in 
their duties, which included substantial mentoring of new local leaders at three campuses. My 
predecessor secured a grant to support the President’s outreach to the campuses. I used those 
funds to visit faculty, but especially COHE members, at all six campuses every year during each 
of the four years of my presidency. Given the vast distances involved, these annual face-to-face 
meetings had probably never been attempted previously. I engaged COHE Board members one-
on-one both in person, and via phone and email. This increased communication—which 
consumed substantial time—worked because two recalcitrant Board members stepped down and 
several others came around to support the overall strategy. 
Our bargaining strategy was also rather simple. Our Board decided that we would play 
offense for the first time in a long time. Previously, COHE had rarely offered its own proposals 
during bargaining. This time, we undertook a year-long process to develop specific, defensible 
bargaining proposals. It began with a comprehensive list of everything we wanted changed in the 
contract, more than 70 ideas. The COHE membership was actively engaged in the process of 
commenting and prioritizing these items. The survey results were analyzed by the Board, who 
developed 17 specific proposals. These proposals were vetted at meetings on all six campuses. 
That process, and its product, supported our determination to win “something big” for the 
faculty. We would not agree to a contract unless we could point to some fruitful provision that 
we won. Moreover, we agreed that we were willing to work the bargaining system. We entered 
the negotiations in good faith; hoping to earn a positive victory for the faculty. We were prepared 
to do the hard work of negotiating: explaining every nuanced point, deconstructing the legal 
language, bringing in alternatives, and offering trade deals. We wanted a negotiated agreement, 
one that both sides could sign. We did not want an imposed contract.  
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The Nature and Character of the People in the Process 
“The role of individuals in the bargaining process may be the single most influential factor 
that guides the parties” (DiGiovanni, 2011, p. 5). A dozen or more individuals may play a 
significant role in the bargaining process, including local union leaders, academic officers, and 
general counsels. In South Dakota, the management team comprises some of the BOR central 
staff, led by their General Counsel. Very rarely, a campus-based academic administrator or the 
university attorney may attend, if a bargaining session is held convenient for them. COHE’s team 
included a bargaining representative from each campus, typically the local president, and the 
state COHE President served as chief negotiator. I was particularly fortunate to have an active 
team that included both experienced and new bargainers. Each negotiator was assigned one or 
two areas of responsibility, which worked well during the early sessions. 
Nonetheless, DiGiovanni (2011) contends “the chief negotiator plays the largest role in 
guiding the outcome of bargaining” (p. 5). He outlines at least five tasks for the chief negotiator, 
including (1) serving as the public face of the team, (2) explaining and advancing the client’s 
proposals, (3) crafting, assessing, and judging the impact of the proposals, (4) interpreting what 
is crucial and what is noise, and (5) setting the overall tone for the discussions. 
In South Dakota, the current General Counsel for the BOR has served as management’s 
chief negotiator for nearly three decades. This decision irrevocably sets the tone of the 
negotiations from the start. An attorney, a professional primarily concerned with legal language 
as management’s face implies a confrontational situation. Why not the BOR Executive Director 
or the system HR director? Indeed, neither the Executive Director nor any Regent has ever 
participated in a single bargaining session. This suggests that the faculty contract is merely a 
legal matter, not an opportunity to communicate directly with the most important employees in 
the BOR system. 
The General Counsel leads the BOR’s bargaining efforts, collaborates with his colleagues 
among the BOR staff, communicates with the university Presidents and academic affairs officers, 
serves as liaison to the Regents, develops proposals, crafts language, keeps tables notes, and 
creates a recitation letter for most negotiation sessions. The current individual has served as chief 
negotiator under several Executive Directors of the Board of Regents, under numerous Regents 
Presidents, and under several governors. It is safe to say, that he has ownership of the collective 
bargaining agreement. Virtually every section contains language he crafted. Indeed, far more 
than half of the total text is words he wrote. He is comfortable and authoritative in the process 
and has led innumerable contract negotiations.  
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Like any rational actor, he attempts to routinize and regularize the process. I suspect he did 
not expect anything extraordinary coming into this bargaining round. In past bargaining sessions, 
he routinely claimed the head of the table, a simple but effective means of establishing 
dominance. A decade ago, in one bargaining session when I was our campus representative, I 
arrived early and sat in “his” chair. He was clearly disconcerted, and it led to a particularly 
rambunctious meeting. I noticed that when he began bargaining with me as lead negotiator, he 
choose to sit across from me, perhaps unconsciously signifying the equality of the parties. In 
short, he is influential in the process. As this individual approaches retirement age, we might 
contemplate what bargaining would like with a new management lead negotiator. Even if the 
succeeding BOR General Counsel were to serve as the BOR’s chief negotiator, it would open the 
prospect of a new tone for negotiations and the possibility of substantial changes in the actual 
contractual language. 
How can I describe myself as chief union negotiator? While it is a difficult proposition, I 
think my colleagues would agree with the following characterizations. I am passionate about the 
role of faculty in higher education. I firmly believe in shared governance and oppose the 
autocratic model we have in South Dakota public higher education. I care about my fellow 
faculty and believe they are trying to do a good job in a trying situation. I am impatient for 
changes that would improve the status of faculty, because it is the single most important reform 
necessary in South Dakota higher education. If faculty experts are consulted, empowered, and 
united, we could dramatically improve higher education in South Dakota far more substantially 
than any university president, BOR Executive Director, or governor. In bargaining and other 
environments, I am very sharp-elbowed, pushing my ideas to the forefront. I am comfortable 
interrupting a speaker, if they are going down a road that consumes unnecessary time and is not 
relevant to our conversation. 
Early on, I clearly indicated to the BOR’s General Counsel that any prior understandings, 
ground rules, or other standard procedures with previous COHE Presidents were no longer valid. 
I stressed that COHE was under new leadership, which was a fundamental break from the past. 
Also, I repeatedly expressed the idea that COHE members were not satisfied with the current 
contract and would not agree to an inadequate contract. Indeed, a cadre of members—union 
activists—were intensely focused on the bargaining and had heightened expectations. They 
proved to be a stalwart foundation at several points. 
Again, it is difficult for me to modest here. Based on my colleagues’ assessments after each 
session, they report I was articulate, offered good explanations of our proposals, rationally and in 
logical terms. I explained how our proposals were good for the university and how their 
proposals were unfair or counterproductive to higher education. 
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This combination of an experienced management negotiator and a new overly-combative 
labor leader could have led to disastrous results. Nonetheless, we developed a professional—if 
strained—relationship, with few distractions from the process. Contrary to DiGiovanni’s 
prediction, an unruly labor negotiator did not prove poisonous to obtaining a signed contract that 
contained victories for labor. 
The Aspects of Timing in Negotiations 
DiGiovanni (2011) appropriately identifies timing, the right time to act or delay, as an 
important influence on negotiation outcomes. He recognizes that external events, which are 
largely beyond the negotiators’ control, often have a dramatic effect on bargaining. However, 
events internal to the process are also significant. Participants’ decisions on when to deliver a 
proposal or hold tight, when to counter-propose can influence outcomes. 
In many ways, timing and history may have joined to create a unique opportunity for 
COHE to win our recent victory. The BOR engaged in their standard routine, based on years of 
unaltered experience. The first—and lengthy—stage involved each side presenting their 
proposals and vetting the other side’s proposals. Then began the difficult maneuvering to 
discover what each side held dear and what was trade bait. Some proposals were withdrawn, 
some reformed. As often happens in negotiations, we ended up with different perceptions. They 
thought we had reached an impasse, we thought we could still make a deal. After 18 months, 
they formally declared an impasse and imposed a contract. 
In the second stage, as I detail in Appendix A, we requested a new round of bargaining. 
The BOR staff were taken aback somewhat, expecting to continue with only the few remaining 
contentious items. An entirely new round of bargaining likely meant another year or more of 
negotiations. They followed another standard ploy: when they could not get us to agree, they 
offered the most draconian proposals they could imagine. They had regularly done this in past 
rounds, to good effect, for them. Past COHE leaders, fearful that terrible proposals would be 
imposed and COHE would be blamed, would back off. Labor would quickly agree to withdraw 
all of our proposals and sign a contract with the trade bait removed.  
Of course, we expected them to come up with trade bait, but were surprised by the severity 
of their two proposals. One was to eliminate tenure. In brief, their proposal was a tenure 
retention plan; every seven years, every faculty member would be required to re-apply for tenure. 
The other proposal was to reduce the royalties a faculty member could earn on intellectual 
property by one-half.  
10
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In our view, neither proposal made sense for higher education in South Dakota. In a state 
where faculty salaries are among the lowest in the country, where there are limited urban 
amenities, and a near-arctic winter climate, how would we recruit and retain high-quality faculty 
by being the only public universities in the nation without tenure? The effect would be 
catastrophic, likely leading to very high turnover, especially among the junior faculty. Faculty 
impermanence would destroy academic programs and the traditions/cultures of each university. 
A cut in royalties on intellectual property would reduce the incentive for faculty to produce 
commercializable research, which was contrary to the enormous effort to reify research in the 
last decade. We were sure there would be pushback on this proposal by the state’s power elite. 
Venture capitalists, economic development leaders, and others would not understand how this 
proposal fit with the effort to create a local knowledge industry. 
A couple of local labor leaders argued we should follow the well-tread route: trade our 
signature for the withdrawal of the two onerous proposals. Our team walked away from the 
bargaining table convinced the BOR had just painted themselves into a corner. However, the 
majority of faculty activists understood the BOR was bluffing. The sole asset we possessed that 
they needed was our signature on a collective bargaining agreement. As it became evident that 
we were willing to wait, they were faced with three choices: (1) stick to their guns and impose 
another contract that included these impossible-to-defend provisions; (2) lose face and impose a 
contract without these provisions; or (3)  offer us something substantial to gain our signature. 
It is not entirely clear why, but the BOR choose the third option. I have little evidence on 
which to evaluate their efficacy, but two possibilities exist.  
First, maybe there was some pressure on the BOR to get a signed contract. I suspect 
someone behind the scenes thought that an imposed contract meant that the faculty were not on 
board with the mission of higher education in South Dakota. Or perhaps, someone thought that it 
might hurt the recruitment and retention of faculty superstars or, more likely, third-party 
contributions to the universities. After negotiations, I recently contacted nearly a dozen possible 
informants to understand these background machinations; none produced any additional insights. 
Maybe someone with influence wanted the university system to appear to speak with a unified 
voice before the state’s political system. 
The second possibility is that our organizing—broadly conceived, including 
communicating and framing the issues—might have brought the BOR and their staff to prefer a 
signed contract. Three readers of the earlier manuscript, including an anonymous reviewer of this 
journal, suggest that our ramped-up communication effort and our drive to change the culture of 
labor defeatism influenced the outcome. That is, our public release of their draconian trade bait 
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of tenure removal coupled with our refusal to sign a positive-outcome agreement triggered a 
change in BOR strategy. Either or both of these possibilities might explain our victory. 
Catharsis 
DiGiovanni (2011) lists catharsis as the final influence on bargaining; it is “the opportunity 
for each side to express what they need to say to each other in the safe environment of formal 
negotiations” (p. 8). Especially in South Dakota, for collective bargaining to function properly, 
management must truly listen to union concerns. In bargaining, the few angry activists can 
express the emotions of hundreds of other employees. Responsible managers acknowledge 
labor’s concerns and will offer a counterproposal to address the issues. 
For COHE, a sense of defeatism permeated our organization. Too many faculty, both 
members and non-members, perceived the labor union as a “toothless tiger” fighting to stay 
alive. To change the culture, we needed a positive victory. We are an association of professional 
educators who cared about improving higher education, not a bunch of naysayers and 
malcontents. If productive bargaining presupposes mutual respect, which requires equitable 
resources, we were reframing the conversation. 
The BOR staff did listen to us on two issues: inept supervisors and salary compression. 
While they did not agree to our initial proposals on these issues, they agreed to continue the 
conversation through joint committees on both topics (see Appendix). By removing these 
discussions from the formal bargaining environment, the BOR counterproposal for these 
committees provided a non-confrontational avenue to understand the dimensions of the problems 
and to seek innovative solutions. If necessary, these solutions can be brought into future 
contractual negotiations. 
A further example of management listening closely to our concerns was the BOR’s 
counterproposal to offer additional protections for contingent faculty (see Appendix). They 
rejected our initial proposal for continuing contracts “as unworkable at this time.” Nonetheless, 
once they understood that we represent and care about the unstable employment circumstances 
of our contingent colleagues, they offered a good proposal, which we accepted.  
Assessing the Intangible Factors 
Of the five factors assessed here, history and timing played the largest role in influencing 
the outcome to COHE’s advantage. Even with unrealistic expectations and a combative lead 
negotiator, our strategy led to labor’s first victories in years. If my conjectures about the unseen 
actors are right, history and timing were critical to our success. The state’s research initiative 
brought new players into the higher education labor-management arena. Bringing in new players, 
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“expanding the conflict,” is often an effective tactic for the weaker party (Schattscheider, 1960). 
In a one-on-one fight, the weaker individual will inevitably lose. However, when more players 
arrive, the weight of the new participants may favor the weaker side. In any case, if you are 
going to lose mano a mano, better to take a chance to improve the odds with a new arrangement 
of the players. In our case, I assume these new players, those outside higher education, wanted a 
signed contract. COHE, as the weaker party, now possesses a new advantage, if outsiders who 
support research continue to pressure the BOR. 
Perhaps the influence of the DiGiovanni’s (2011) five factors varies by case, but in this 
case, the historical changes in the public higher education meant that the BOR could no longer 
play the same game of dominating labor at every turn. If they hope to recruit and retain active, 
nationally-prominent researchers, the universities must inevitably enhance shared governance 
and respect faculty voices. 
In other states, the faculty voice may be weaker because of nationwide changes. However, 
in South Dakota, where we had so little power previously, the nationalizing of our universities 
and the concomitant increased research expectations has created an opening for labor to grab a 
sliver of power. We possess a simple obstacle to labor peace: our signature on a collective 
bargaining agreement. New players—venture capitalists, politicians who favor the knowledge 
industry, and the national market for faculty researchers—mean that COHE has gained potential 
allies. Like all games, there are temporary winners and losers in politics. Unlike static games, 
however, political rules are dynamic and constantly evolving. Obstinate and willful disregard for 
changes in power could return labor to irrelevancy. 
We must astutely judge the appropriate balance between cooperation and stubbornness. 
Staking and holding an early position is an aspect of expectations. Richard Neustadt (1991), in 
his famous exposition on presidential leadership, argues that a key factor that enhances a 
president’s power is his professional reputation. Neustadt defines professional reputation as a 
judgment by Washington elites of a president’s consistency on an issue and his willingness to 
act. Presidents who perennially change position—who are too easy to roll—lose power as 
compared to presidents who stake a clear position and stick to it. In many cases, obduracy 
enhances one’s power, if one has the ability to withhold what the other party needs. 
Our steadfastness gave us the determination to fight off the BOR’s horrendous “trade bait” 
of removing tenure. We made it clear from the beginning and repeatedly throughout the 
negotiations that we would not be able to sell an agreement to our members without a clear 
victory, a positive accomplishment, “something big” for the faculty. And we delivered. 
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Appendix: Review of Labor Victories in Recent Contract 
 
The recent round of bargaining between the South Dakota Board of Regents (BOR) and 
the South Dakota Council of Higher Education (COHE) was the most comprehensive review of 
our agreement since our first contract in 1979. Nearly every section was touched or discussed in 
some fashion, if not changed. Over 30 months, two dozen negotiating sessions took place in six 
towns in virtually every corner of the state. The new contract provided significant gains for 
faculty and the university community in two stages. 
The first stage was an imposed contract that included modest victories described below. 
In this stage, the parties were unable to reach agreement on three proposals, which led to the 
BOR’s imposed contract (Interim Terms 2011). The three unresolved items were:  
(1) A BOR proposal that intellectual property should not be considered a working condition 
of the faculty and, thus, was no longer a bargainable item, except for the division of 
royalties.4 
(2) A BOR proposal to eliminate tenure for all newly-hired librarian faculty through the 
creation for librarian faculty of a new series of ranks similar to the newly-created 
Instructor ranks. 
(3) A COHE proposal to provide additional protections for faculty terminated through the 
reduction in forces provision (i.e., lay-offs). 
 
This imposed contract included a large number of changes, many of which COHE agreed 
to. Some changes were good for bargaining unit members and the university at large, including 
the creation of Instructor ranks for contingent faculty. Under this system, full-time instructors 
(i.e., those with no research or service obligations) are now assigned a rank (Instructor, Lecturer, 
and Senior Lecturer) based on education and experience, and earn an associated rank pay 
increase. COHE also agreed to other provisions, to which we were initially opposed, as part of a 
trade to obtain the pay increase for summer/overload discussed below. This appendix does not 
review all changes to our contract, but only those COHE proposed and were successful in 
obtaining. We considered these COHE proposals as modest victories in the imposed contract:  
(1) An increase in the percent of base salary paid for overload and/or summer courses from 
seven percent to eight (for a standard three-credit, undergraduate class). This increase is 
actually a return to a previous standard, when the BOR had imposed seven percent. 
(2) Averaging of our performance evaluations over a three-year period, instead of solely the 
annual evaluation. As discussed in the article, South Dakota public university faculty are 
forbidden from earning across-the-board salary increases. Rather, a complex system of 
annual evaluations, market comparisons, and administrative unit decisions are employed 
to arrive at a salary increase. With zero salary increases from 2009 - 2011 and volatile 
salary increases likely in the future, COHE convinced the BOR negotiators that faculty 
who performed exceptionally well in years with a small pay increase should not be 
penalized. 
                                                 
4
 This prime sticking point resulted from the BOR’s insistence that intellectual property was no longer a bargaining 
item and COHE’s unwillingness to agree to any contract that removed it. To prevent this disagreement from 
hampering a final contract, both parties agreed to disagree. The signed agreement (BOR/COHE Agreement 2013) 
recognizes that the imposed terms removed intellectual property from the bargaining environment, but also 
recognizes COHE’s ongoing legal actions to challenge that decision as an unfair labor practice (ULP). The ULP is 
working its way through the legal system in South Dakota. 
15
Aguiar: Collective Begging in South Dakota
Published by The Keep, 2013
(3) The creation of two “joint system committees.” For the first time, BOR staffers and 
academic administrators are meeting with COHE members to discuss these two important 
issues. This is a success in that we got the BOR to recognize these two issues as 
important and worthy of further discussion. The two committees are 
a. Salary compression and inversion. A fifteen-year, system-wide effort successfully 
boosted the salaries of junior faculty. However, combined with the complex 
salary formula, that effort produced widespread and continuing inequities between 
junior and senior faculty. The gap between newly-hired and senior faculty in 
nearly all departments has compressed. In some departments, inversion has 
occurred; Assistant Professors—freshly-minted PhDs with no experience—are 
among the highest paid faculty in their departments, receiving a higher salary than 
top-performing Full Professors who have served for three decades! Moreover, 
nearly one-quarter of Full Professors are paid 65% or less than their market target 
(Langelett, 2013). The BOR has made significant strides to improve faculty 
salaries with a stated goal of 90% of market. 
b. Inept supervisors. COHE persuaded BOR negotiators that South Dakota’s 
autocratic management system sometimes produces ineffective department heads. 
In South Dakota, department heads are managers appointed “for good behavior” 
and often serve for decades. They completely control faculty careers, including 
workload, evaluations, grant support, budget, and other resources. Thus, faculty 
are reticent to identify inept supervisors to upper administration. Further, the 
grievance process does not reveal the shoddy performance of poor supervisors 
because faculty are reluctant to file grievances for fear of retaliation, which in 
some cases were overt. Clearly, it does not serve the public interest or the 
universities to have incompetent supervisors, especially since the primary means 
of discovering them can easily derive from faculty communications to upper 
administration. 
 
After 18 months in this first stage, the BOR negotiators thought the bargaining was done. 
They declared an impasse; COHE employed the mediation and fact finding steps to no avail. The 
BOR imposed a contract effective January 1, 2011. A few months later, COHE approached the 
BOR negotiators with an offer to begin a fresh round of bargaining with new proposals. This 
request surprised the BOR staff, because they interpreted the law as requiring them only to 
negotiate on the outstanding, unresolved items from the previous sessions. Our interpretation, 
based on advice from our attorney, was that after an imposed contract, we entered an entirely 
new bargaining round. Our request to enter bargaining came with our announcement that we had 
the right—and intended to act on it—to bring forward new items to negotiations. Needless to 
say, the BOR negotiators were displeased and frustrated. 
After this second stage, a final contract was agreed to by both parties—and signed in June 
2013—one that included all unresolved items, except the intellectual property dispute which is 
being adjudicated by the state courts. In this new master contract (July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2016), 
COHE won two provisions that significantly protect faculty and promote the well-being of the 
university system by simultaneously enhancing faculty loyalty to their institutions and 
recognizing the value of high-performing faculty: 
(1) A reform of Reduction in Force (RIF) retention priorities. Under the previous RIF 
provision, administrators identified units (e.g., departments or programs) slated for 
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layoffs. Faculty within these units were ranked for retention according to their 
performance, based solely on their supervisors’ evaluations from the previous three years. 
So, layoffs occurred among the lowest-rated faculty first, regardless of rank or seniority. 
The new provision recognizes the achievement of excellence by rank promotions. So, 
priority for retention under the new RIF procedures employs ranks as the decision rule. 
Full Professors are retained first, then Associate Professors, followed by Assistant 
Professors and so forth within the instructor ranks. Moreover, within these ranks, 
retention is determined by seniority; those with longer service are retained over those 
were fewer years of service. Restated, future layoffs occur first among the lowest ranks of 
lecturers and continue up through the ranks of the lecturers and then the professoriate. 
(2) “Tenure-like” protections for instructor ranks. To support the new instructor ranks, to 
which we prior agreed in the imposed terms, COHE won advance notification of non-
renewal of their annual contracts. Previously, a faculty member in the instructor ranks 
could be notified of non-renewal the day before their contract began (i.e., five days 
before classes began). Now, Senior Lecturers (i.e., those with a terminal degree and eight 
years of service) must receive eight months notification that their contract will not be 
renewed. Moreover, they are entitled to the same grievance procedures as a tenure-track 
faculty member who is terminated, including a committee of peers to review the non-
renewal decision. 
 
While we obviously hope that neither of these provisions will be used, both have occurred in the 
recent past. South Dakota State University, the state’s largest university, suffered layoffs in 2010 
with great pain. Fifty-five employees were laid off due to a 10% across-the-board cut in state 
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